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Abstract
In a team production problem with unverifiable effort, budget breaking is essential
to implementing efficient levels of effort. This short paper considers the use of a third
party, who does not exert effort, in a setting with general contracts that can include
message games, as a way to remove resources from the team. We show that if side
contracting can influence behavior in a message game in the original contract, the
addition of the third party is not helpful. Additionally, we compare our view of side
contracting with that of Baliga and Sjostrom (2009) to explore the nature of side
contracting that is needed in order for the third party to be useful for budget breaking.
JEL Classification: C70, D74, K10.
Holmstrom’s (1982) pioneering work on team production, with unverifiable effort, showed
that budget breaking, as a way to punish all teammembers in the event of sub-optimal output
(meaning someone shirked), is essential to inducing efficient levels of effort. Renegotiation
prevents the team members from agreeing to destroy output in the event of sub-optimal
effort. So contracting with a third party who undertakes no productive activity, but receives
a transfer from the team members when someone shirks has been explored as a way to break
the budget. However, if the third party can collude with one of the team members so that
the team member shirks and then the two divide the transfers that the third party receives,
budget breaking is not effective for implementing efficient levels of effort. Holmstrom noted
that this could pose a problem, and Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) showed that the third party
is not helpful because of this potential for collusion. Neither of these papers considered
general contracts that could include message games, and there has been recent interest in
whether the addition of message games provides a way to avoid the collusion problem.
In this short paper we study the use of a third party as a budget breaker in a deterministic
team-production setting when contracts can contain message games and evaluate whether
this allows the third party to be effective as a budget breaker. We focus on the opportunity
for one of the players to side contract with the third party, and allow for exactly the same
contracting technology in both contracts—the original contract between the n players in the
∗I thank Joel Watson for his generous comments. An earlier version of this paper was titled “Budget-
Balancing and Side-Contracting in Team Production.”
†Department of Economics, Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199. Email: bullj@fiu.edu.
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team and the third party, and the side contract between a team member and the third party.
Specifically, we assume that contracts can condition on the value of output and on public
messages sent by players. We find that, in this situation, the third party is not effective as
a budget breaker.
The contract between team members and the third party specifies a division of verifiable
output as a function of public messages and the level of output; we refer to this contract as the
original contract. After contracting, the team members choose effort, which deterministically
determines the level of output and is commonly observed by the players. The players then
send messages, on which the original contract conditions. If there is a side contract in place,
it also conditions on these same messages. One practical interpretation of this modeling
of messages is that the original contract and the side contract can each condition on the
messages of the other contract.
We allow for two side contracting opportunities. In the first, which occurs after the
original contract is agreed to and before team members choose effort, a team member and
the third party may side contract. Such a side contract can be used to shape the colluding
players’ behavior in both the team production and the original-contract message game. In
the second, which occurs after the realization of output and before the original contract
message game, any subset of the players may side contract. This side contract can be used
to shape the colluding players’ incentives in the original-contract message game.
Recognizing that side contracting will disrupt the effectiveness of the third party as a
budget breaker, we require that original contracts are impervious to side contracting. We
show that for any original contract that satisfies the impervious to side contracting condition,
the third party is useless for budget breaking.
We then compare our model of side contracting with that of Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2009)
who find that the third party is effective for budget breaking. The different findings are due to
the differences in our assumptions about how effectively the players can side contract. Baliga
and Sjo¨stro¨m assume that a team member and the third party can only side contract over
the level of output and private side contract messages. That is, they do not allow for a side
contract to condition on the same messages that the original contract does, or to condition
on the allocation imposed under the original contract. We assume that a side contract can
condition on the same messages as the original contract, but not on the allocation imposed
under the original contract. Further, we show that when a side contract can condition on
the allocation imposed under the original contract (but not on the same messages as the
original contract) that the third party is ineffective for budget breaking. Our aim in this
direction is to understand the qualifications for Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m’s novel result, and to
broaden their analysis.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sketches the model from Holmstrom’s (1982)
seminal paper. In Section 2 we incorporate message games, side contracts, and the third
party. We discuss the relationship with Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2009) in Section 3. We then
briefly conclude in Section 4.
2
1 The Standard Model
We consider a version of Holmstrom’s (1982) deterministic team production model that
explicitly allows for a third-party budget breaker and message games. Players 1, 2, . . . n
choose costly effort, which determines the value of production. Player i’s effort is denoted
by ai ∈ Ai, and we let A = ×i=1,...nAi. The value of production, joint monetary output, is
given by q : A → R, and q is strictly increasing, concave, and differentiable with q(0) = 0.
Player i’s cost of effort is given by vi : Ai → R, and vi is strictly convex, differentiable,
and increasing with vi(0) = 0. Player i’s payoff is given by ti − vi(ai), where ti denotes the
transfer (or share of x = q(a)) that player i receives.
Holmstrom does not consider message games or side-contracts with a third party who is
used as a budget breaker. His model has each player receive a share of the joint monetary
outcome that is given by si(x). Note that a is unverifiable and that x is verifiable. An
externally enforced contract is a function s from output to shares, satisfying that the sum
of the shares does not exceed output. His Theorem 1 shows that when budget balance is
required,
∑
i=1,...n si(x) = x, it is not possible to implement the optimal level of investment
a∗. The optimal investment levels a∗ solve
max
a∈A
[q(a)− v1(a1) − v2(a2)− · · · − vn(an)].
However, when the budget does not have to be balanced, Holmstrom’s Theorem 2 shows
that a∗ can be implemented. The example in his proof specifies
si(x) =
{
bi if x ≥ q(a
∗)
0 if x < q(a∗)
.
The bi’s are chosen so that
∑
i=1,...,n bi = q(a
∗) and bi > vi(a
∗
i ) > 0.
Thus, Holmstrom shows that if all of the output can be given to a third party, it is possible
to implement the efficient investment a∗. Holmstrom noted that if collusion between one of
the players and the third party was possible, the usefulness of the third party as a budget
breaker may be negated. Eswaran and Kotwal (1984) show this to be the case. However,
neither of these studies allows for general contracts with message games. We allow for more
general contracts and formally model the side contracting. In incorporating the third party
into the game as a player, we assume that the sum of the shares must exactly equal x.
2 Incorporating Messages and Side-Contracting
We allow for a message game in both the original contract and the side contract. We present
the model by first considering the interaction without the side contracting and then add
it. As in the Holmstrom setting, the team members’ effort choices, which are unverifiable,
deterministically lead to verifiable output x. Although a is unverifiable, we assume that it
is commonly observed by the players.1
Prior to choosing effort, the team members and the third party contract. The timing
of the players’ interaction is illustrated in Figure 1. The contract specifies an allocation
1It is straight forward to extend our results to the case where effort choices are private information.
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Figure 1: Timing of events.
of the output x between all of the agents, which also represents transfers because negative
allocations are allowed, as a function of verifiable items. The verifiable items include both
the realized output x and messages that the players send following the realization of x. The
players select messages from a grand message space M ≡ ×i∈NMi, where Mi is the set of
feasible messages for player i and N ≡ {1, . . . n, T}. A contract is F : M × R → Rn+1,
where F (m, x) is the allocation imposed given message profile m and output x. Player i’s
allocation, given a message profile and realized output is denoted by Fi(m, x). We require,
due to the possibility of renegotiation, that the players’ allocations are balanced meaning
they sum to x.
We now turn to opportunities for side contracting. Side contracting is not observed by
the other players, and a side contract may contain a message game. A side contract is
f :M ×R→ Rn+1, with
∑
j∈N fj = 0 and fk = 0 for all k not involved in the side contract.
Note that the message profile that the side contract conditions on is the same one on which
the original contract conditions. One interpretation is that both the original contract and
the side contract condition on the same court proceedings and the information that comes
out of those proceedings. Note that for a sufficiently rich grand message space, it could be
as though there are messages for the original contract and messages for the side contract,
and that both contracts can condition on the messages of the other. Importantly, we do
not allow the original contract to condition on whether there is a side contract, and neither
contract can condition on the public action imposed by the other contract.
We allow for two opportunities for side contracting; these are labeled (a) and (b) in
Figure 1. Recognizing that side contracting at either of these opportunities will disrupt
using the third party to break the budget, we require that the contract the players agree to
be impervious to side contracting at either opportunity. We follow Bull and Watson’s (2004)
treatment of coalitions for settings with externally-enforced side contracts.
We will describe the equilibrium/solution concept, which requires that contracts are
impervious to side contracting, shortly. It is helpful to first examine what side contracts
can achieve, given fixed F and behavior. This allows us to consider the potential for a side
contract between one of the team members and the third party, which is the opportunity
described in (a) in Figure 1. Fix F and behavior of the −i team members at a
i
, and assume
that the messages of the −i team members are functions of x and a. We denote player j’s
message choice by µj(a, x). It is possible for player i and the third party to use the side
contract as a “forcing” contract to induce any effort level by player i, ai, and any messages
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by player i and the third party as a function of x, µi(x), and µT (x). We focus on pure
strategies. The forcing contract relies on the other team members (the −i players) playing
the anticipated a−i, given the original contract. By conditioning on the realized x, which will
correspond to the anticipated a−i and side contracted ai, player i and the third party can
side contract so as to punish player i for deviating, by requiring that she pay an arbitrarily
large transfer to the third party, holding fixed a−i, from their agreed upon ai. Then either
player i or the third party can be punished, again with an arbitrarily large transfer paid
to the other member of the coalition, for unilaterally deviating from (µi(x), µT (x)). Note
that, although we normally consider the players choosing their messages as a function of the
effort levels, which they observe, we consider the players side contracting over messages as
a function of output because output is verifiable and effort is not.
Lemma 1: Consider a side-contract between player i and the third party T , given an original
contract and holding fixed the associated a∗
−i that would be induced without a side-contract.
Any ai, µi(x), and µT (x) can can be implemented with a forcing contract between i and T .
Proof: Hold fixed, the behavior of the players other than player i and the third party (the
−i players). Note that it is possible to induce any messages from i and T , as a function of x,
with a side-contract. Given x the side-contract can specify an arbitrarily large transfer from
a player who unilaterally deviates from (µi(x), µT (x)) to the non-deviating player. Given
this, it is also possible to specify any attainable x, given the anticipated play of a∗
−i, with
a forcing contract. This simply requires imposing a large transfer from player i to T if the
level of x that corresponds to the desired ai and anticipated a
∗
−i is not observed. That is, if
q(ai, a
∗
−i) is not realized, require that i pay an arbitrarily large transfer to T . Q.E.D
Thus, a team member i and the third party T can effectively act as single player. Note
that side contracts, which induce shirking, between several team members and the third
party are possible in practice. To simplify the exposition we focus primarily on the potential
for a single team member and the third party, but note that our results will generalize to
side deals in which several team members agree to shirk.
We also consider side deals, between two or more players, concerning only messages and
assume that these can be formed after the realization of output x but before the disclosure
of messages. This opportunity is denoted by (b) in Figure 1. These side deals are also
private and are not observed by the other players until after messages have been presented.
Thus, the point of writing a side contract is to induce members of the coalition to change
their behavior in the original-contract message game in a way that benefits the coalition.
To evaluate whether this is possible, define FJ(m) ≡
∑
j∈J Fj(m), where J ⊂ N is the
coalition, and let fJ (m) be defined analogously. Suppose that following effort profile a, and
the corresponding output x, the players would coordinate on disclosure of messages µ(a) in
the absence of side contracting. Further suppose that, by side contracting, a coalition J can
induce its members to disclose messages mˆJ . Then the coalition strictly gains from the side
deal if and only if
FJ(µ−J (a), mˆJ) + fJ (µ−J (a), mˆJ) > FJ(µ(a)) + fJ (µ(a)),
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which is equivalent to FJ(µ−J (a), mˆJ) > FJ(µ(a)) because fJ = 0. Here, “−J” stands for
the complement of J .
In a manner similar to that used to induce shirking and then coordination on messages,
the parties to such a side deal can force disclosure of specific messages. Specifically, a coalition
J can specify f so that any player j ∈ J who does not disclose a specified message must
pay an amount y to each of the other players in the coalition.2 Thus, after the realization
of x and before the disclosure of messages, coalitions can effectively spot contract on which
messages to disclose. In practical terms, a side contract may amount to joint disclosure
of messages. Furthermore, side contracts can be used by a coalition to rearrange transfers
internally.
We require that the original contract is impervious to side contracting at both opportu-
nities, (a) and (b), for side contracting. Following Bull and Watson (2004), we use the term
impervious to side contracting instead of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium because the latter
is defined for self-enforced contracts (Nash equilibria) of standard non-cooperative games,
while we require a version that examines externally enforced contracts.3 We examine F and
behavioral rule a, µ : A→ M , and require that it passes the impervious to side contracting
test.
Definition 1: Given an externally-enforced contract F , a behavior rule a and µ is called
impervious to side contracting (ISC) if
(i) Fi,T (µ(a), q(a)) ≥ Fi,T (µ(a
′
i, a−i), q(a)), for each i and a
′
i, and
(ii) FJ(µ(a
′), q(a′)) ≥ FJ(m
′, q(a′)) for each a′, each q(a′), each coalition J ⊂ N , and
each m′ ∈M that is a J-deviation from µ(a′) at a′ and q(a′).
Note that the ISC condition includes deviations by a single player, so every ISC disclosure
rule is also an equilibrium disclosure rule.
The combination of the ISC condition and the constant-sum aspect of externally-enforced
transfers prevents the existence of message game phenomena. Thus, the externally-enforced
transfers imposed following a given level of output x must be the same for any effort levels
a that led to x.
Lemma 2: Consider any a′ and a′′ such that x = q(a′) = q(a′′). For any ISC message rule
µ(a), it must be that F (µ(a′), x) = F (µ(a′′), x).
Proof: Suppose not. Then it must be for some a′ 6= a′′ such that x = q(a′) = q(a′′) that
F (µ(a′), x) 6= F (µ(a′′), x) and for some J ⊂ N FJ(µ(a
′), x) < FJ(µ(a
′′), x).
Consider the message profile (µJ (a
′′), µ−J (a
′)). Note that coalition J can induce this as
a J -deviation from µ(a′) and coalition −J can induce this as a −J -deviation from µ(a′′). In
2Then any sub-coalition K ⊂ J will lose at least y when one or more of its members deviates from the
prescription of f . The number y can be set large enough so that this loss is greater than any gain the
sub-coalition can get by way of the original contract F .
3That is, ISC is Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston’s (1987) definition applied to externally enforced con-
tracts. Following Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston, we view a side contract as viable only if it is immune to
disruption by sub-coalitions (who have to pass the same test). However, the issue of sub-coalitions is easily
handled in our model, because forcing contracts, as described above, can always be designed to stifle any
further side dealing by sub-coalitions.
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order for µ to be ISC, given F , it must be that such a J -deviation is deterred following a′,
which requires
FJ(µJ (a
′′), µ−J (a
′), x) ≤ FJ(µ(a
′), x).
Additionally, deterring the −J -deviation from µ(a′′) requires
F−J(µJ (a
′′), µ−J (a
′), x) ≤ F−J (µ(a
′′), x),
which, because transfers must be balanced, is equivalent to
FJ(µJ (a
′′), µ−J (a
′), x) ≥ FJ(µ(a
′′), x).
Combining yields
FJ(µ(a
′), x) ≥ FJ(µJ(a
′′), µ−J (a
′), x) ≥ FJ(µ(a
′′), x),
but we have assumed FJ(µ(a
′), x) < FJ(µ(a
′′), x). So this is a contradiction. Q.E.D.
This means it is only possible to punish one of the team members following the realization
of a given suboptimal value of output. Since any suboptimal value of output, x < q(a∗),
can be induced by any of the team members unilaterally deviating from a∗ this prevents the
contract from implementing the optimal effort level a∗.
Corollary 1: Adding a third party to this team production problem does not allow efficient
levels of effort a∗ to be implemented.
In fact, we show a stronger result: adding the third party does not change the set of
implementable effort profiles.
Theorem 1: The set of implementable effort profiles a is the same with or without a third
party.
Proof: Without the third party, consider message game F (µ(a), x). In order for a to be
implementable, there must be an F (µ(a), x) and an ISC message rule µ(a) such that selecting
a is an equilibrium given F .
For µ(a) to be an ISC message rule, we need
FJ((µJ(aJ), µ−J (a−J), x) ≥ FJ((µ
′
J , µ−J (a−J), x), for all µ
′
J , a, x = q(a), J.
Given the ISC message rule, define g(a) ≡ F (µ(a), x). For a to be an equilibrium, given g(a)
requires
g(ai, a−i)− vi(ai) ≥ g(a
′
i, a−i)− vi(a
′
i), for all ai, i.
Since we can view a colluding player and the third party as one player, these constraints do
not change with the addition of a third party. Q.E.D
We now elaborate on the role of the ISC condition and the observability, by the players,
of effort choices. Lemma 2, which shows that message game phenomena are not possible,
relies on the ISC condition. Since the effort choices are observed by all players the absence of
the requirement that behavior satisfy the ISC condition would allow for different equilibria
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being played following different choices of a that lead to the same level of output x. This is
because equilibrium is only concerned with unilateral deviations, but when side contracting
is possible we need to be concerned with deviations by coalitions of players.
However, when individual effort choices are not commonly observed message game phe-
nomena are not possible even with standard equilibrium conditions. This is because each
player would need to observe a—not just ai—in order for them to condition the equilibrium
m that is played on a.
3 Relationship to Baliga-Sjo¨stro¨m
We feel that in most practical settings it is possible for a side contract to be able to condition
on the messages that the original contract message game conditions on, and study a model
which allows both the original contract and side contract to condition on the same set of
public messages.4 However, when it is not possible for a side contract to condition on the
messages conditioned on by the original contract, there is scope for using a third party to
break the budget.
Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2009) consider a model in which the original contract and the side
contract each have a private message game with private messages so the side contract cannot
condition on private messages in the original contract (and vice versa). The timing in their
model is the same as that of our model with the exception of the separate private message
games for each contract. The message game for the original contract is played first, its
allocation/transfer is imposed, and then the message game for the side contract is played.
Importantly, they assume, as we do, that the side contract cannot condition on the outcome
of the original contract. They find that the third-party can be used to break the budget.
Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m’s analysis demonstrates that the efficacy of third-party budget break-
ing relies on the side contract being unable to condition either on messages in the original
contract or on the allocation imposed by enforcement of the original contract. In this section,
we further explore the extent to which their interesting finding relies on the side contract
being unable to condition on the original contract messages and allocation. We begin by
describing the conditions that must be satisfied for third-party budget breaking. Then we
briefly describe Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m’s “whistle-blowing” equilibria construction, which al-
lows for budget breaking. Next we describe another class of equilibria construction that relies
only on messages from the team members and allows for budget breaking. We then compare
Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m’s model with ours. Following Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m, the analysis here
focuses on teams with two members, but extends to teams with more than two members.
Deterring Side Contracting
If the third party is to be effective for budget breaking, we must be able to overcome the
incentive for a player to collude with the third party and then exert slightly less than her
optimal level of effort, say a∗i − ε, where ε is close to zero. This type of side contract would
allow the third party to induce a player to side contract, and, thus, prevent us from inducing
the incentives given by Holmstrom’s budget breaking (in his Theorem 2) discussed above.
4As noted in Section 2, this reflects the notion that the both contracts can condition on the messages for
the other contract.
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Preventing side contracting, and the subsequent underinvestment, requires that we be
able to use the message game of the original contract to deter side contracting. For any
x < q(a∗) there are two unilateral deviations from a∗ that can cause x: a unilateral deviation
by player 1 and a unilateral deviation by player 2. Denote these by q(a′1, a
∗
2) = q(a
∗
1, a
′
2) <
q(a∗). In order to prevent side-contracting, there must be two equilibria following any such
x < q(a∗): one such that player 1 cannot be given the incentive, through a side-contract
with the third party, to deviate to a′1 and another such that player 2 cannot be given the
incentive, through a side-contract with the third party, to deviate to a′2. This means that
player 1 must receive a lower payoff in the former equilibrium than she does in the latter.
Likewise, player 2 must receive a lower payoff in the latter equilibrium than she does in the
former.
It is not possible to provide these incentives for both players simultaneously. To see this,
consider player 1’s potential side-contracting and deviation to a′1. Player 1 must be required
to pay a transfer to player 2 if we are to deter the side-contract. If instead the outcome of
the message game required that player 1 pay a transfer only to the third party, this could
be anticipated and accounted for in the side-contract between player 1 and the third party.
So, in fact, the transfer from player 1 to player 2 must be sufficiently large that it offsets
any possible payment the third party would be willing to make to induce collusion. Thus,
if the original contract specifies that the third party receive all of x when x < q(a∗), the
transfer from player 1 to player 2 must be at least x.5 The same argument holds for player
2’s potential side-contract. We cannot effectively have both players make a transfer to the
other in a single equilibrium following x = q(a′1, a
∗
2) = q(a
∗
1, a
′
2) < q(a
∗).
Lemma 3: Any contract with n = 2, with messages games, that uses a third party to break
the budget must induce two equilibria after any x < q(a∗). The first of these must require
that player 1 pay a positive transfer to player 2, and impose a lower overall transfer for
player 1 than in the second equilibrium. The second equilibrium must require that player 2
pay a positive transfer to player 1, and impose a lower overall transfer for player 2 than in
the first equilibrium.
Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m recognized this and constructed “whistle-blowing” equilibria as a
way to deter side contracting.6 Note that in our setting in Section 2 by Lemma 2, it’s not
possible to have two such equilibria following sub-optimal effort by one of the team members.
Whistle-Blowing Equilibria
Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m’s whistle-blowing equilibria rely on the third party naming, in the
original contract message game, the team member with whom he colluded (who then shirks)
when the realized output is not optimal, x < q(a∗). In such a case, the team member, say
team member i, is required to pay a sufficiently large transfer to both the third party and
5Clearly, other schemes may work to implement a∗, ignoring the issue of collusion with the third party.
However, if the proposed scheme does not work, schemes that involve a smaller share of x being given to the
third party will not work.
6Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m require that, when team member i is named by the third party, an allocation such
that i receives −2Z, j receives Z, and the third party receives x+Z. They show (in their Theorem 3, there
is Z > 0 will make this construction work.
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the other team member j. As noted above, the payment to j must be large enough that
the third party and i cannot agree beforehand to a transfer (from the third party to i) that
makes collusion attractive to i.
This equilibrium construction requires that the third party is indifferent as to which team
member he names. To see this, suppose instead that the third party is to receive a larger
transfer from team member i when he names team member than he receives from j when
he names j. Then team member j and the third party have the incentive to collude (so
that j shirks) anticipating that the third party will name i—not j—as having colluded with
him. Such an incentive would prevent the original contract message game from deterring
side contracting, and, hence, prevent third-party budget breaking.
So the “whistle-blowing” equilibria deter side contracting when the third party “rats”
on his partner to the side deal. However, the third party is actually indifferent as to which
team member he names. Naturally, if there were scope for the third party to commit to
name team member j instead of team member i, i and the third party would side contract.
This required behavior by the third party does not fit with the, perhaps common, view of
colluding players not “ratting” on each other.
Other Ways of Implementing
Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m’s “whistle-blowing” equilibria are not the only way to prevent side
contracting. Original-contract message games that contain versions of the familiar method
of “Nash implementation with harsh punishments” will also deter collusion. Consider the
case where, following x < q(a∗), only the team members—not the third party—disclose
messages.7 Let the team members’ messages simply be naming which team member shirked.
When the team members’ messages both name team member i as having shirked, i pays
an appropriate transfer to both the third party and player j.8 If their messages do not agree,
they each are required to pay a sufficiently large (larger than the sum of the transfers that
are paid by the agreed upon shirker when they agree) to the third party.9 Thus, the team
members are essentially forced to agree on which of them colluded or each must pay a large
transfer to the third party. The team members both naming the one who shirked is an
equilibrium.
Note that collusion with the third party cannot disrupt this equilibrium because there is
no way for, say, team member i and the third party to commit to behavior in the original
contract message game. This is because the side contract cannot condition on either messages
in the original contract or on the allocation imposed under the original contract. Importantly,
if the side contract could condition on either of these, a team member could commit to shirk
and then to not “agree” in the message game. Further, she could be given the incentive to
do this because the third party could be required, under the side contract, to pay a transfer,
7A similar construction that relies on messages from both team members and the third party is also
possible.
8Recall from above that deterring side contracting requires that the shirking team member pay a positive
transfer to both the third party and the other team member.
9Note that any original contract that conditions only on messages of the two team members (and x) and
implements the two equilibria (following a given value of x) must involve a payment by both team members
when i’s message corresponds to one equilibrium and j’s message corresponds to the other equilibrium.
Otherwise, there is no way to deter unilateral deviations from both equlibria.
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which would offset the large transfer that she would be required to pay to the third party,
to the shirking team member.
Of course, this method of deterring side contracting may be considered problematic
because, as with the typical use of harsh punishment Nash implementation, there are multiple
equilibria. Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m do not consider this type of construction because they are
concerned with strong implementation. We don’t regard multiple equilibria to be a problem
in general. So we wouldn’t use this as a reason to dismiss the construction. Instead, we
assert that this construction reveals how limited the form of side contacting that Baliga
and Sjo¨stro¨m assume is. Their form of side contracting, where the side deal is not able to
condition on anything but x, cannot have any impact on rational behavior in the message
phase of the original contract.
Side Contracting – Middle Ground
Our model essentially assumes that the side contract can condition on the original-
contract messages. Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m’s model assumes that it cannot. Both have as-
sumed that the side contract can condition on x, but not on the allocation imposed under
the original contract.
A reasonable “middle ground” is to assume that the side contract cannot condition on the
original-contract messages, but can condition on the allocation imposed under the original
contract (as well as the value of x). Some practical motivation for this, in terms of a court
as the external enforcer for the original contract, is that the decisions of courts are typically
publicly available. However, even with this middle ground assumption on the scope for side
contracting, our main result holds: the third party is useless as a budget breaker. That the
side contract can condition on the allocation imposed under the original contract provides a
way for the colluding players (a team member and the third party) to shape their behavior in
the original-contract message game, and this allows them to effectively side contract, which
disrupts budget breaking.
Theorem 2: Suppose players can side contract over the allocation imposed under the orig-
inal contract, F (m, x)—in addition to side contracting over x, but not on the messages in
the original-contract message game. Then it is not possible to deter side contracting with an
original-contract message game and the third party is not useful for budget breaking.
Proof: To prove this, we consider the different possible constructions of equilibria. Recall
that following any suboptimal x there must be two equilibria so that each team member
can be deterred from colluding with the third party. We can look at differentiate classes
of original-contract message games based on which players send messages, or, analogously,
which players messages differ between the two equilibria following a given value of x.
This yields four cases to consider:
(a) only the third party’s message “matters”
(b) only the team members’ messages “matter”
(c) only the message of one team member and the third party’s message “matter”
(d) the messages of both team members and the third party’s message “matter.”
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Note that the case where F conditions on only the message of one team member and x
will not work because there is no way to have two different equilibria of the nature that is
needed. That team member will always prefer one of the equilibria to the other, and, thus,
will always present the message that corresponds to her preferred equilibrium.
We have already dealt with cases (a) and (b) in our discussion above, and described how
the ability to side contract over F would disrupt play of the desired equilibria. We briefly
describe how this results in team member i and the third party side contracting before the
team members select effort. For case (a), i and the third party can commit prior to the effort
selection that the third party will select the message that leads to j being punished (due to
the ability to side contract over F ). So i and the third party would collude and there would
not be effective budget breaking.
In case (b), player i and the third party would agree that i would shirk and then play an
out of equilibrium message in the original-contract message game so that the team members
would pay a transfer to the third party. Since they can condition their side contract on F ,
they could side contract so that the third party would then pay a transfer to i. That transfer
could be set so that both i and the third party do better than if a∗ had been selected by the
team members.
We now turn to case (c). Suppose, without loss of generality, that team member i and the
third party are the players who send messages—that is, team member j’s message doesn’t
matter. Consider two equilibrium message profiles that, following x < q(a∗), implement a∗.
Denote the message profile for when i has shirked by (mii, m
i
T ), and similarly the message
profile when j has shirked is (mji , m
j
T ). We will show that, given the properties of F at these
two equilibria that are needed to implement a∗ and for these to be equilibria, i and the third
party will side contract prior to the team members selecting effort, and i will exert effort
that is less than a∗i .
Suppose that i and the third party collude so that i is to choose ai arbitrarily close to
a∗i to induce x˜ arbitrarily close to q(a
∗), and then they are choose message profile (mji , m
j
T ).
First consider whether they would side contract so as to induce F (mji , m
j
T , x˜). That (m
j
i , m
j
T )
is an equilibrium means that neither has the incentive to unilaterally deviate. Further, each
can be given the strict incentive not to unilaterally deviate. Turning to the issue of whether
i and the third party jointly do better by x˜ being produced instead of x = q(a∗), recall that
by assumption the cost savings from shirking is advantageous and since this side contracting
limits us to only one allocation following x˜ we cannot prevent both i and j from having the
incentive to collude with the third party.
We now evaluate case (d). Consider the case where player i has shirked and the players
are to send the messages for the equilibrium that punishes player i. Denote this message
profile by (mii, m
i
j, m
i
T ), where, as above, subscripts denote the player sending the message
and superscripts denote the player that shirked. Using the equilibrium condition for player
i and that this equilibrium punishes player i, it must be that
Fj(m
i
i, m
j
j, m
j
T ) ≤ Fj(m
j
i , m
j
j, m
j
T ) < Fj(m
i
i, m
i
j, m
i
T ).
Since transfers are balanced this implies that player i and the third party could jointly do
better by each sending their message for the equilibrium that punishes player j. Further,
since it’s possible for i to choose effort arbitrarily close to a∗i to induce x arbitrarily close to
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q(a∗) there is incentive for i the third party to collude before the choice of effort. They can
effectively side contract to do so because the side contract can condition on F .
We have covered each case and have showed that a team member and the third party
have the incentive to side contract and are able to effectively do so. In each case this disrupts
the use of the third party to break the budget. Q.E.D.
4 Conclusion
In this short paper, we have explored the use of message games to potentially allow a third
party to be useful for breaking the budget in a team production problem. We have shown
that when it is possible for the side contract to condition on the same messages as the
original contract, the third party is of no use for breaking the budget and does not help in
attaining efficient investment. Due the difference in assumptions about the effectiveness of
side deals, our main result differs from that of Baliga and Sjo¨stro¨m (2009). We explored these
differences, and found that a more middle ground assumption that side deals can condition
on the allocation imposed under the original contract also yields our main result.
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